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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - EQUAL PRO-
TECTION - PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION - SELECTIVE PROSECU-
TION - The United States Supreme Court held that evidence
tending to show different treatment of similarly situated individ-
uals is required to obtain discovery in support of a selective pros-
ecution claim.
United States v. Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. 1480 (1996).
From February to April of 1992, federal agents penetrated a
suspected drug trafficking ring through the use of informants.1
On several occasions, the informants bought crack cocaine from
the defendants, who are African-American, and observed them
carrying firearms. 2 The federal agents eventually searched the
room in which the drug sales were conducted and arrested the
defendants.
3
In April of 1992, the defendants were indicted for drug-
trafficking and firearm violations.4 In response to the charges,
defendants filed a motion for pre-trial discovery, or in the alter-
native, a motion for dismissal.5 They based their motions on a
claim of selective prosecution, stating that they were singled out
for prosecution under the federal criminal statute because of
their race. To support a discovery motion in connection with
their selective prosecution claim, the defendants submitted a sin-
gle affidavit by an employee of the Federal Public Defender's
Office which alleged that all individuals charged with the same
offenses as the defendants were black.
7
1. United States v. Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. 1480, 1483 (1996).
2. Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1483.
3. Id.
4. Id. Specifically, respondents were indicted on charges of: a) conspiring to pos-
sess with intent to distribute more than fifty grams of crack cocaine; b) conspiring to
distribute the crack cocaine under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846 (1988 & Supp. IV); and c)
using firearms in connection with drug-trafficking. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. Selective prosecution is the exercise of prosecutorial discretion when
enforcing criminal laws that are either discriminatory on their face, motivated by a dis-
criminatory purpose or have a discriminatory effect. John E. Nowak & Ronald D.
Rotunda, Constitutional Law, § 16.49 (5th ed. 1995).
7. Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1483. The affidavit alleged that the defendants were
black in all twenty-four crack cocaine cases handled by the Public Defender's Office. Id.
1073
Duquesne Law Review Vol. 35:1073
Despite the Government's opposition, the district court
granted the discovery motion.' The Government sought recon-
sideration of the court's ruling,9 claiming that race was not a fac-
tor in the criminal investigation or prosecution decisions. 10 To
rebut the Government's position, one of the defense attorneys
submitted an affidavit stating that an intake coordinator at a
drug user rehabilitation center alleged there is generally no dif-
ference between the number of caucasian and minority drug
users and dealers." The defendants then illustrated that even
though the number of drug offenders was equally diffused
between white and black individuals, only the black offenders
were charged with federal crimes, while the white offenders were
charged with state offenses.' 2
The district court judge denied the Government's request for
reconsideration and later dismissed the case due to the Govern-
ment's refusal to comply with the discovery order.'3 On appeal, a
split three-judge panel from the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit reversed the district court's ruling.14 The court held that
the defendants did not successfully establish that other nonblack
but similarly situated defendants had not been prosecuted. 5
The Court of Appeals subsequently reheard the Government's
appeal en banc, and as a result, overruled its prior decision and
affirmed the district court's order of dismissal. 6 On rehearing,
8. Id. at 1484. The court ordered the Government to do the following: (1) provide
a list of all cases from the last three years in which the Government charged individuals
with cocaine and firearms offenses; (2) identify the race of the defendants in those cases;
(3) identify what levels of law enforcement were involved in the investigations of those
cases; and (4) explain its criteria for deciding to prosecute those defendants for federal
cocaine offenses. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. To further its position, the Government stated that: (1) there was over one
hundred grams of crack found on the defendants in this case, which is over twice the
threshold limit for a federal mandatory minimum sentence of ten years; (2) there were
multiple sales and firearms violations involving the numerous defendants; (3) the evi-
dence was strong and included both audio and video tapes of the drug sales; and (4) sev-
eral of the defendants had criminal histories. Id. In addition, the Government submitted
a report indicating that large scale, interstate crack cocaine manufacturing, distribution
and trafficking networks were controlled by Jamaicans, Haitians and Black street gangs.
Id.
11. Id.
12. Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1484. Defendants submitted an affidavit from a crimi-
nal defense attorney alleging that many nonblacks are prosecuted in state court on
crimes involving possession and distribution of crack. Id. The penalties for these crimes
in state court are considerably lighter. Id. at 1493 n.5.
13. Id. at 1484.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 1484. The appellate court held that the defendants must provide a "col-
orable basis" for believing their claim of selective prosecution before discovery may be
obtained. Id.
16. Id. at 1484-85.
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the court held that a defendant is not required to show that the
government did not prosecute others similarly situated under a
claim of selective prosecution. 17 The defendants then filed a writ
of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court, which was
granted so that the Court could determine the appropriate stan-
dard for discovery in selective prosecution cases.1
8
The Supreme Court began its analysis by discussing Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 16.19 Defendants had argued that
Rule 16, which provides for discovery of documents within the
Government's possession material to the preparation of a defend-
ant's defense, mandates that documents pertaining to each and
every claim or defense possibly resulting in the defendants'
acquittal be revealed.20 The Court rejected this argument, how-
ever, holding that Rule 16 authorizes the defendants to examine
documents related only to their defense against the Govern-
ment's case-in-chief and not to their claim for selective
prosecution.2'
The Court then discussed the standard for proving and
obtaining discovery in selective prosecution cases.22 Assuming
that discovery is allowed for selective prosecution claims if the
claimants produce the required quantum of evidence supporting
17. Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1484-85.
18. Id. at 1485.
19. Id. See FED. R. Cam. P. 16(aXlXc) (1994 & Supp. 1997). Rule 16 provides, in
pertinent part:
Upon request of the defendant the government shall permit the defendant to
inspect and copy or photograph books, papers, documents, photographs, tangible
objects, buildings or places, or copies or portions thereof, which are within the pos-
session, custody or control of the government, and which are material to the prepa-
ration of the defendant's defense or are intended for use by the government as
evidence in chief at the trial, or were obtained from or belong to the defendant.
FED. R. CRn. P. 16(aX)(1XC) (1994 & Supp. 1997).
20. Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1485.
21. Id. The Court explained the concept of a "defense" generally includes any
claim that may be used as a "sword" to challenge the "prosecution's conduct of the case."
Id. The Court then described a second, narrower class of claims as "shield" claims. Id.
Shield claims refute the prosecution's claim that the defendants committed the acts as
charged. Id. The Court found that Rule 16 supports the latter reading because of a "per-
ceptible symmetry" between documents material to preparing a defendant's defense and
documents intended for Government use as evidence for trial. Id. The Court drew this
conclusion from the language in Rule 16(aX1XC) and Rule 16(a)(2). Id. See FED. R. CRne.
P. 16(a)(2) (1996). The Court reasoned that if the defendants' reading of Rule 16(a)(1XC),
which includes selective prosecution in the concept of "defense," was accepted, the defend-
ants could discover Government work product from every other prosecution except work
product created for their own case. Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1485.
22. Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1485. The Court noted that a selective prosecution
claim is an independent assertion rather than a defense aimed at the merits of the crime
charged. Id. at 1486. A selective prosecution claim asserts that the Government has
brought the charges against the defendant for reasons prohibited by the United States
Constitution. Id.
1076 Duquesne Law Review Vol. 35:1073
the claims,23 the Court characterized the standard for proving
prosecutorial irregularity as very high.24 According to the Court,
the claimants must show that the prosecution's policy "had a dis-
criminatory effect and ... was motivated by a discriminatory
purpose."25
The Court noted that in order to demonstrate a discriminatory
effect in a race case, a claimant must present evidence indicating
that the government did not charge or try similarly situated indi-
viduals with different racial identities. 26 Contrary to the defend-
ants' position,2 v the Court found a mere allegation that members
of only the defendants' race were prosecuted, without a showing
that members of other races engaging in similar activity were not
prosecuted, is insufficient.'
Finally, the Court discussed how to obtain discovery in sup-
port of a selective prosecution claim.29 The Court first noted that
since discovery in a selective prosecution claim is costly and
exposes the law enforcement tactic employed by the Government,
23. Id. at 1485-86. The Court noted that the executive branch has the responsibil-
ity of law enforcement and such responsibility entails using broad discretion in determin-
ing which cases to prosecute. Id. at 1486. Such discretion is accompanied by a
presumption of regularity that can only be overcome by clear evidence to the contrary.
Id. This discretion is, however, subject to constitutional constraints, including the equal
protection guarantee under the Fifth Amendment. Id.
24. Id. The Court stated that entertaining such a claim means exercising judicial
power over the executive branch. Id.
25. Id. at 1487.
26. Id.
27. Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1487. In support of their position that the defendants
are not required to show that similarly situated persons have not been prosecuted,
respondents cited Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) and Hunter v. Underwood, 471
U.S. 222 (1982). Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1487. In Hunter, one black and one white
person challenged the constitutionality of a provision of the Alabama Constitution disen-
franchising offenders convicted of crimes of moral turpitude. Hunter, 105 S. Ct. at 1918.
The evidence illustrated that the crimes involved were largely committed by black per-
sons, and that the intent of the 1901 Convention that adopted the provision was moti-
vated by disenfranchising blacks persons. Id. at 1919-22. The Supreme Court held in
Hunter that this Alabama constitutional provision violated the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Id. at 1922.
In Batson, the petitioner, a black man, was indicted on charges of burglary and
receipt of stolen goods. Batson, 106 S. Ct. at 1715. On voir dire, the prosecutor exercised
all four peremptory challenges to exclude four black jurors from the jury. Id. The
Supreme Court held that once the defendant establishes a prima facie case of discrimina-
tion in selection of a jury, consisting of: (1) showing the defendant is a member of a cogni-
zable racial group; (2) illustrating the fact that peremptory challenges are inherently
susceptible to discrimination; and (3) proving that these facts with other relevant fact
raise an inference of discrimination, the burden shifts to the prosecution to provide a
neutral explanation of its peremptory challenges. Id. at 1723. The Court then held that
if the prosecutor does not come forward with a neutral explanation on remand of the case,
the petitioners convictions must be reversed. Id. at 1725.
28. Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1487.
29. Id. at 1488-89.
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the standard for obtaining discovery for such a claim should cor-
respond with the high standard for proving a selective prosecu-
tion claim.30 The Court then stated that the vast majority of
appellate courts require some evidence indicating that while the
government could have prosecuted similarly situated defendants
of other races, it did not.3 In conclusion, the Court found the
standard for obtaining discovery in a selective prosecution claim
to be "a credible showing of different treatment of similarly situ-
ated persons."3 2 This standard, noted the Court, adequately pro-
tects the defendant from selective prosecution and aids the
Government in protecting the public from crime. 3 The Court
then held that in this case, the defendants' evidence did not con-
stitute a sufficient showing of different treatment." As a result,
the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals
and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with
its opinion.
35
Justice Breyer wrote a separate opinion in Armstrong concur-
ring with the majority decision in part.36 Justice Breyer noted
that he did not agree with the Court, however, as to whether a
defendant can request inspection of only those documents mate-
rial to his or her defense against the Government's case-in-chief
under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16." According to
Justice Breyer, this reading of Rule 16 limits the rule's intended
application.38 Justice Breyer reads the rule to categorize all of
the materials that the Government is required to produce. 9
In response to the majority's argument regarding the work-
product exception to Rule 16 which requires the Government to
produce documents, 4° Justice Breyer thought that the work-prod-
uct exception ought to have exceptions of its own, including a
credible claim of selective prosecution.41 Justice Breyer also
30. Id. at 1488.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 1489.
33. Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1489.
34. Id. The Court noted that the study proffered by defendants failed to show that
individuals of other races could have been prosecuted yet were not. Id. The Court noted
that a newspaper article discussing discrimination in federal sentencing laws was not
relevant to a discrimination allegation with respect to the decision to prosecute, the affi-
davits submitted by defendants contained hearsay, and the defense attorney's personal
conclusions were drawn from statements of a party not participating in the proceedings.
Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 1489-92.
37. Id. at 1489.
38. Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1491,
39. Id. at 1490.
40. FED. R. CRm. P. 16(a)(2) (1996).
41. Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1491,
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believed, however, that the defendants in this case did not make
the threshold showing necessary to obtain discovery for their
selective prosecution claims.42
Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion focused on why discovery
was appropriate in this case.' 3 He specifically pointed out that
three factors justified close vigilance over the prosecution by the
federal.judiciary in this case: (1) the extremely high penalties for
federal crimes involving possession and distribution of crack
cocaine as compared to crimes involving powder cocaine;44 (2) the
absence of disparity between penalties for crimes involving crack
cocaine and powder cocaine at the state level; 4' and (3) the bur-
den of stricter federal penalties for crack cocaine offenses, which
falls almost entirely on blacks.'6
Justice Stevens' opinion also discussed the authority of district
court judges to order discovery for selective prosecution claims.
47
He agreed with the majority that Rule 16 does not provide courts
with the authority for ordering discovery in such cases.48 Justice
Stevens also found that the evidence submitted by the defend-
ants in this case in support of their selective prosecution discov-
ery request was insufficient to give them a right to discovery.49
Notwithstanding this, however, Justice Stevens stated that dis-
trict court judges have inherent judicial powers allowing them to
order such discovery. 0 These powers, he believes, stem from two
factors: (1) the responsibility of the prosecutor, as a member of
the bar, to uphold the rules of professional conduct in executing
42. Id. at 1491-92.
43. Id. at 1492-95.
44. Id. at 1492. Justice Stevens pointed out that the crime of possessing or distrib-
uting one gram of crack cocaine is treated the same as the crime of possessing or distrib-
uting one hundred grams of powder cocaine. Id. (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANuAL § 2D1.1(c) (1995)). He then stated that such treatment has resulted in sentences
for crack cocaine to be three to eight times longer than sentences for comparable offenses
involving powder cocaine. Id. at 1492-93.
45. Id. at 1493. Most states make no distinction in sentencing based on whether a
crime involves crack or powder cocaine. Id. (citing United States Sentencing Commis-
sion, Special Report to Congress: Cocaine and Federal Sentencing Policy 145 (Feb 1995)
[hereinafter Special Report]). The states that do distinguish in sentencing do not estab-
lish as stark a differential as does the federal government. Id. (citing Special Report at
129-38).
46. Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1493. Justice Stevens points out that while 65% of
persons who used crack cocaine in 1993 were white, they represented only 4% of the fed-
eral offenders convicted of trafficking in crack cocaine. Id. (citing Special Report at 39,
161). At the same time, 88% of such defendants were black. Id. (citing Special Report at
39, 161). In addition, the Justice noted that black persons on average received sentences
over 40% longer than whites. Id. (citing Special Report at 163).
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his or her public duties; and (2) the district court judges' unique
position in enforcing this responsibility.51 Justice Stevens then
found that the facts contained in the defendants' evidence in this
case were "sufficiently disturbing" 2 and thus a basis upon which
the district court judge, in the exercise of her sound discretion,
was authorized to order the Government to produce relevant doc-
uments in response to the selective prosecution claim.5 3 Accord-
ing to Justice Stevens, therefore, the district court judge neither
exceeded her power nor abused her discretion by ordering the
discovery.
5 4
Selective prosecution jurisprudencea arose with the seminal
case of Yick Wo v. Hopkins,"5 decided in 1886.6 In Yick Wo, the
United States Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of
a San Francisco ordinance requiring operators of laundries in
wooden buildings to obtain a permit from the board of supervi-
sors.5 7 In that case, the petitioners, natives of China, were
imprisoned because they operated laundries in wooden buildings
without obtaining the consent of the Board of Supervisors of San
Francisco. 8 Under the ordinances, the Board of Supervisors had
absolute discretion to grant or deny the permit5 9
The petitioners contended that the ordinances were void on
their face under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution, or, in the alternative, void due to their
racially biased enforcement as between similarly situated laun-
dry operators.6 0 The petitioners in Yick Wo alleged and estab-
lished that two hundred other applicants of Chinese nationality
had also been denied such permits upon application, while eighty
nonChinese laundry operators were granted permits.6 1
The Supreme Court of California upheld the convictions.6 2
The United States Supreme Court then granted certiorari in the
51. Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1492.
52. Id. at 1495.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. 6 S. Ct. 1064 (1886). Since Yick Wo, selective prosecution has apparently been
continuously treated as a denial of equal protection under the law. See Armstrong, 116 S.
Ct. at 1487. The Supreme Court in Armstrong declared that a selective prosecution claim
is to be analyzed under the general standards for equal protection. Armstrong, 116 S. Ct.
at 1487.
56. Yck Wo, 6 S. Ct. at 1064.
57. Id. at 1066-73.
58. Id. at 1066.
59. Id. at 1065, 1068-69.
60. Id. at 1070-71.
61. Yick Wo, 6 S. Ct. at 1073.
62. Id. at 1066.
1997 1079
Duquesne Law Review
case.6 3 Upon hearing the case, the Supreme Court pointed out
that all of the conditions contained in the ordinances had been
complied with by the permit applicants.' The Court then noted
that while similarly situated individuals were granted permits,
Yick Wo's permit application was denied without reason.65
According to the Court, this was sufficient proof of impermissible
discrimination.66 Since no explanation for this discrimination
was provided except for open hostility to race and nationality, the
Court found the convictions in this case in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 7
In 1905, the requirement of showing similarly situated per-
sons had not been prosecuted for similar criminal offenses under
a claim of selective prosecution was reiterated in the case of AA
Sin v. Wittman.68 In that case, Ah Sin petitioned for a writ of
habeas corpus, seeking release from incarceration for violating a
San Francisco ordinance prohibiting the set up and display of
gambling tables and gambling paraphernalia in barricaded
rooms. 69 Ah Sin alleged that the ordinance under which he was
prosecuted was enforced only against persons of Chinese origin.70
At trial, Ah Sin's claims were rejected. 7' Upon petition for a writ
of habeas corpus, the Superior Court for the City and County of
San Francisco affirmed the decision of the police court and dis-
missed the writ.72
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in the
case and affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court, rejecting
the petitioner's contentions that enforcement of the gambling
ordinance against Chinese persons constituted a denial of equal
protection in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Con-
stitution.73 -The Supreme Court based its holding on the failure
of the petitioner to allege either that the conduct criminalized by
the gambling ordinance also occurred among the nonChinese
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. In Yick Wo, the second prong of the modem test, discriminatory purpose,
seems to have been inferred from statistical and other extrinsic evidence of disproportion-
ate impact. Id. The state showed no other reason for disparate impact of the ordinance's
administration. Id. In effect, the burden of proof seems to have shifted to the state to
demonstrate that it was motivated by permissible criteria. Id.
66. Yick Wo, 6 S. Ct. at 1073.
67. Id.
68. 25 S. Ct. 756 (1905).
69. Ah Sin, 25 S. Ct. at 757.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 757.
72. Id. at 757-58.
73. Id. at 758-59.
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population, or that there were nonChinese offenders against
whom the ordinance was not enforced.74
The 1944 case of Snowden v. Hughes7M produced two new
aspects with respect to a claim of selective prosecution that can
be found in the modern analysis of such claims as presented in
Armstrong.76 The first aspect is the discriminatory intent ele-
ment that must be found with respect to the discriminatory
application of the law.77 The second aspect is the existence of
permissible and impermissible classifications of persons to whom
the law is applied.78
In Snowden, the Supreme Court faced the issue whether a
State Primary Canvassing Board violated the Privileges and
Immunities Clause and Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment by failing to nominate a second candidate for
state representative in accordance with Illinois law.79 Pursuant
to the Illinois statute, the Canvassing Board had a duty to nomi-
nate two Republican and one Democratic candidate for election
for state representative.8 0 The plaintiff in the case received the
second highest number in the Republican primaries.81 The plain-
tiff alleged, however, that the Canvassing Board "wilfully, mali-
ciously and arbitrarily" refused to nominate him, thus depriving
him of being elected for state representative since nomination
and certification by the Board was tantamount to election.8 2 The
complaint asserted that the Canvasing Board's failure to nomi-
nate him violated his rights protected by the Privileges and
74. Ah Sin, 25 S. Ct. at 759. At the time Ah Sin was decided, the Supreme Court
apparently considered the ordinance to be discriminatory on its face if it regulated "condi-
tions and practices" existing only among Chinese persons, or de facto discriminatory if
there were others similarly situated and not prosecuted under the gambling ordinance.
Id. Selective prosecution or selective enforcement is distinguished from a discriminatory
law. See Yick Wo, 6 S. Ct. at 1070-71. In selective prosecution, the law is usually fair and
nondiscriminatory on its face, but the administration or enforcement of the law is dis-
criminatory. See id. at 1070-73. Notably, in both Yick Wo and Ah Sin, the Supreme
Court was ready to accept evidence of "disparate impact" or what shall later become "dis-
criminatory effect," without more, as evidence of a discriminatory intent. Ah Sin, 25 S.
Ct. at 759 (citing Yick Wo, 6 S. Ct. at 1073). Although the language in Yick Wo and Ah
Sin may point to a discriminatory design, neither of the two cases articulate the discrimi-
natory intent as a separate element in order to have the state action invalidated. See Ah
Sin, 25 S. Ct. at 756; Yick Wo, 6 S. Ct. at 1064. This additional element, discriminatory
intent, or discriminatory purpose in the administration of laws, was introduced by the
case Snowden v. Hughes, 64 S. Ct. 397 (1944).
75. 64 S. Ct. 397 (1944).
76. Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1486-87.
77. Snowden, 64 S. Ct. at 401.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 398-99.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 399.
82. Snowden, 64 S. Ct. at 399.
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Immunities Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. 83
The district court dismissed the action and held that the alle-
gations did not show a right protected by the United States Con-
stitution or the laws of United States to be violated.' 4
Additionally, the court found that the failure of the Canvassing
Board to nominate the complainant did not constitute state
action."6 On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the district
court's ruling.
8 6
The United States Supreme Court subsequently affirmed the
district court's decision, stating that the Privileges and Immuni-
ties Clause does not protect rights pertaining to state citizenship
and established by state law.8 7 As to the equal protection claim,
the Court stated that the statute in question required classifica-
tion between a successful and an unsuccessful candidate, and
held such classification permissible.8s Continuing, the Court
stated that an official action taken pursuant to this legitimate
statute was not necessarily a denial of equal protection unless it
was completed with an intent or purpose to impermissiblly dis-
criminate.8 9 The Court stated that to show such impermissible
discrimination, one must show, as the plaintiff here did not, the
intent to discriminate either on the face of the classification or
through extrinsic evidence of discriminatory design or inten-
tional and purposeful discrimination.'
The modern decision of Oyler v. Boles91 stands as a further
refinement of the requirements for proving impermissible dis-
crimination. In Oyler, the petitioners were sentenced to life
imprisonment under a West Virginia habitual offender statute.92
Petitioner Oyler subsequently filed for a writ of habeas corpus,
alleging that he was denied procedural due process and equal
protection under the Fourteenth Amendment because he was
discriminatorily selected for life imprisonment. 93 Specifically,





87. Snowden, 64 S. Ct. at 400.
88. Id. at 401.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 401.
91. 82 S. Ct. 501 (1962).
92. Oyler, 82 S. Ct. at 502. The West Virginia habitual offender statute provided
for a mandatory life sentence upon the third conviction of a crime punishable by confine-
ment in a penitentiary. Id. (citing W. VA. CODE § 6130 (1961)).
93. Id.
1082 Vol. 35:1073
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was applied without advance notice and only as to a minority of
persons subject to its provisions.94
In support of his contention, Oyler alleged that while there
were six men sentenced between 1940 and 1955 in the county
court who were subject to the mandatory habitual offender stat-
ute, only Oyler was sentenced to life imprisonment. 9 In addi-
tion, Oyler stated that although there were nine hundred and
four other known offenders throughout the state of West Virginia
subject to the mandatory sentencing statute, they were also not
sentenced as habitual offenders.96
Upon hearing Oyler's claims, the United States Supreme
Court rejected his allegations and found that the evidence merely
proved that those not prosecuted under the habitual offender
statute were treated differently because of the prosecutors' lack
of knowledge as to their prior convictions. 97 Noting that the life
sentence for habitual offenders must be proposed to the court
after conviction, but before sentencing, the Court stated that the
records submitted in support of the Oyler's petition may not have
been available to the state when the prosecutor filed its cases.9
According to the Court, this information could have been com-
piled later, during the subjects' incarceration. 9 The Court then
explained that the "conscious exercise of some selectivity in
enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional violation.""°
In response to Oyler's assertion that imposing a life sentence
upon him constituted selective prosecution, the Court stated that
the selection must be deliberately based upon an unjustifiable
standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification,
none of which were alleged by Oyler. 101
After Oyler, selective prosecution jurisprudence took a differ-
ent turn. Courts began to accept evidence of disproportionate
effect or disparate impact to prove or raise an inference of dis-
criminatory intent or purpose. 102 In the cases of United States v.
Crowthers ,103 United States v. Steel' 0 4 and United States v.
94. Id. at 502.
95. Id. at 505.
96. Id.
97. Oyler, 82 S. Ct. at 506.
98. Id. at 506.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. (citing Snowden v. Hughes, 64 S. Ct. 397 (1944); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 6 S.
Ct. 1064 (1886)).
102. See United States v. Crowthers, 456 F.2d 1074 (4th Cir. 1972); United States v.
Steel, 461 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1972); United States v. Falk, 479 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1973).
103. 456 F.2d 1074 (4th Cir. 1972). In Crowthers, the defendants conducted
"Masses for Peace" in the concourse of the Pentagon in protest to the Vietnam war.
Crowthers, 456 F.2d at 1076. They were arrested for creating loud and unusual noise and
1997 1083
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Falk,0 5 the defendants alleged that the Government prosecuted
them for crimes while not prosecuting other similarly situated
persons who committed the same offenses. 06 In these cases the
Fourth, Ninth, and Seventh Circuit Courts of Appeal, respec-
tively, accepted and allowed statistical and other extrinsic evi-
dence showing discriminatory effect to establish a rebuttable
inference that there was "invidious discrimination" or discrimi-
natory intent on the part of the prosecution.107 This inference
served to shift the burden of proof to the Government to show
that its actions were not invidiously motivated, but were based
on legitimate and permissible policy considerations. 0 8
obstructing the Pentagon entrance. Id. at 1077-78. The defendants asserted selective
prosecution and alleged that the Government allowed sixteen other assemblies to gather
in the concourse while singling them out for prosecution because of the anti-war content
of their assembly. Id. at 1078. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals stated that since the
Government possessed evidence proving or disproving selective prosecution, it should
produce evidence in rebuttal of the inference of selective prosecution. Id.
104. 461 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1972). In Steel, the defendants had been ardent oppo-
nents of the population census. Steel, 461 F.2d at 1150-51. In defense to their prosecu-
tion for refusing to answer census questions, the defendants asserted a claim of selective
prosecution. Id. In spite of the Government's refusal to produce evidence regarding cen-
sus offenses, the defendants found six other offenders who had not been prosecuted. Id.
at 1151-52. The six unprosecuted offenders, though, had not publicly opposed the census.
Id. at 1152. In addition, the Government had created files on the defendants and not on
any other offenders. Id. This evidence was sufficient to create an inference of selective
prosecution and to shift the burden of proof to the Government to show that its actions
were not motivated merely because of the defendants exercise of their First Amendment
rights. Id.
105. 479 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1973). In Falk, Jeffrey Falk, a vocal protestor of the
draft, was prosecuted for dispossessing his draft card. Falk, 479 F.2d at 617-18. Falk
claimed that he was prosecuted merely because of his opposition to the draft and showed
that twenty-five thousand other registrants also unlawfully disposed of their draft cards,
but were not prosecuted. Id. at 621. Falk also proffered evidence to the effect that an
assistant United States Attorney told Falk he was targeted because of his draft-counsel-
ing activities. Id. at 619-21. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals decided that there
was sufficient evidence to show selective prosecution and required the Government to
produce evidence to the contrary. Id. at 621.
106. See Crowthers, 456 F.2d at 1074; Steel, 461 F.2d at 1148; Falk, 479 F.2d at 616.
Some scholars divide the analysis between cases dealing with selective prosecution in a
racial setting and cases in a nonracial setting. See Developments in the Law - Race and
the Criminal Process, 101 HAv. L. REV. 1520, 1537 (1988). But the courts, including the
Supreme Court, generally do not distinguish selective prosecution claims according to
whether they involve allegations of discrimination based upon race, religion, exercise of
First Amendment rights or any other arbitrary classification. See Armstrong, 116 S. Ct.
at 1487.
107. See Crowthers, 456 F.2d at 1075; Steel, 461 F.2d at 1148; Falk, 479 F.2d at 616.
108. See Crowthers, 456 F.2d at 1075; Steel, 461 F.2d at 1148; Falk, 479 F.2d at 616.
In United States v. Armtrong, the Supreme Court used none of these cases to discern the
elements of selective prosecution or to set the standard for allowing discovery against the
Government. See Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1485-89. The Supreme Court in Armstrong
relied on the case of United States v. Berrios, 501 F.2d 1207 (2nd Cir. 1974), in which the
Second Circuit laid down the formulaic two-prong test that has become the modern test to
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Certain other courts, however, refused to allow evidence of dis-
criminatory effect to raise an inference regarding the element of
discriminatory intent for selective prosecution claims. 09 One
such court was the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in United
States v. Berrigan."° Berrigan involved the prosecution of Philip
Berrigan and other inmates of the Lewisburg Federal Prison for
smuggling letters in and out of the penitentiary."' In response
to the prosecution, the defendants claimed that they were
selected for prosecution for their outspoken opposition to the
Vietnam war, in exercise of their constitutional rights, and not
for the offenses charged.
1 2
The defendants sought to obtain the prosecutors' testimony
and Government documents related to the prosecution of their
case. The district court denied the defendants' request for dis-
covery, stating that the defendants had failed to present evidence
from which an inference as to the use of improper standards
could be drawn. 1 4 The court found that by their requests for dis-
covery, the defendants merely wanted to circumvent the estab-
lished principle of judicial deference to the decisions of
prosecutors in charging criminal offenders." 5 On appeal, the
Third Circuit agreed with the district court and concluded that
the appellants did not show a "colorable entitlement" or a "color-
able basis" of "discriminatory prosecution" that would entitle the
defendants to the discovery sought."
6
The case of United States v. Berrios," decided in 1974, further
crystallized the elements required for a selective prosecution
claim. 1 8 According to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in
Berrios, an individual with a selective prosecution claim must
prove: (1) that others similarly situated have not generally been
prosecuted for the conduct underlying the charge against the
defendant; and (2) that the Government's discriminatory selec-
tion of the defendant for prosecution has been invidious or in bad
faith, i.e., based upon such impermissible considerations as race,
prove selective prosecution as well as the standard for obtaining discovery. Id. at 1488-89
(citing Berrios, 501 F.2d at 1211).
109. See United States v. Berrigan, 482 F.2d 171 (3rd Cir. 1973); United States v.
Berrios, 501 F.2d 1207 (2nd Cir. 1974).
110. 482 F.2d 171 (3d Cir. 1973).
111. Berrigan, 482 F.2d at 173.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 180.
114. Id. at 181.
115. Id.
116. Berrigan, 482 F.2d at 181. In reviewing the decision of the district court, the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals employed the abuse of discretion standard of review. Id.
117. 501 F.2d 1207 (2nd Cir. 1974).
118. Berrios, 501 F.2d at 1211.
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religion or the desire to prevent the exercise of constitutional
rights.
119
In Berrios, the defendants, Pablo Berrios and others, were
prosecuted for holding a union office within five years after being
convicted of arson. 20 Berrios claimed that he was selected for
prosecution because of his support for Senator McGovern in the
1972 presidential elections and for his efforts to unionize the
Marriott Restaurant Chain.' 21 Berrios offered no evidence, how-
ever, showing that others similarly situated had not been prose-
cuted. 1 22 Nevertheless, Berrios posited that these allegations
were sufficient for further inquiry into the evidence supporting
his claim.123
The district court judge held the offer of proof that Berrios
presented to be sufficient to show a prima facie case of selective
prosecution. 124 The district court ordered the Government to pro-
duce an internal government memorandum for the court to
determine which portions of the memorandum are confidential
and to release the remainder to the defendants.12s Upon the Gov-
ernment's refusal to comply with the order, the district court dis-
missed the case.
126
On appeal by the Government, the Second Circuit held that
the threshold showing for acquiring discovery in a case for selec-
tive prosecution was some evidence demonstrating the existence
of the elements of selective prosecution in conjunction with a
showing that the documents sought are probative of those ele-
ments. 12 7 Otherwise, the court continued, the Government could
be subject to requests for discovery of evidence to which defend-
ants are not normally entitled under the Federal Rules of Crimi-
nal Procedure based on a mere allegation of selective
prosecution. 12s In conclusion, the court remanded and instructed
119. Id. This case is also significant for its discussion of the discovery issues that
are prompted by raising a claim of selective prosecution. Id. at 1210-12.
120. Id. at 1209. The defendant was prosecuted for violating the Labor Manage-
ment and Disclosure Act of 1959, 28 U.S.C. § 504 (1995 & Supp. 1997).
121. Berrios, 501 F.2d at 1209. In support of Berrios' allegation, his counsel submit-
ted an affidavit averring that there have been only three Section 504 prosecutions since
1969, and that President Nixon and his brother were in some way connected with the
Marriott Restaurant Chain's officers. Id. at 1209-10.
122. Id. at 1210.
123. Id. Berrios moved the district court to order the Government to produce a let-
ter from the prosecutor to his superiors seeking authorization to prosecute Berrios. Id. at
1210.
124. Id. at 1210-11.
125. Id. at 1210.
126. Berrios, 501 F.2d at 1210.
127. Id. at 1211-12.
128. Id. at 1211 (citing United States v. Berrigan, 482 F.2d 171, 177, 181 (3rd Cir.
1973)). The court found that Berrios had not shown a single violation for which he was
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the district court to determine the relevant material for estab-
lishing Berrios' selective prosecution claim.129
Finally, in United States v. Wayte,' 30 the United States
Supreme Court definitively closed the door on drawing inferences
of discriminatory intent from discriminatory effect in selective
prosecution cases. In Wayte, the defendant was one of a few per-
sons prosecuted for refusing to register with the Selective Ser-
vice.131  In his defense, Wayte asserted a claim of selective
prosecution, alleging that the Government targeted him because
of his "vocal" opposition to the registration requirement.
132
After stating that the standards for selective prosecution are
the general equal protection standards of discriminatory effect
and discriminatory purpose, the United States Supreme Court
held that Wayte failed to proffer evidence showing the existence
of either of the two. 33 As to the first element, the Court found
that Wayte did not show the Government prosecuted any of the
defendants on the basis of their speech.'m As to the second ele-
ment, the Court found that the Government's mere awareness
that there would be "vocal offenders" raising a claim of selective
prosecution if criminally charged did not mean that the Govern-
ment intended to prosecute those particular offenders. 135 In con-
prosecuted that had been committed by others who were not prosecuted, even though, as
the court believed, evidence of this element was not in the exclusive possession of the
Government. Berrios, 501 F.2d at 1211-12.
129. Id. at 1212-13. The appellate court held the district court did not abuse its
discretion by ordering the Government to produce the letter to the court, but abused its
discretion by ordering the Government to release the letter, or any portion thereof, that
was not confidential to the defendant. Id. at 1212.
130. 105 S. Ct. 1524 (1985).
131. Wayte, 105 S. Ct. at 1528. After a Presidential Proclamation requiring the
defendant and others similarly situated to register, Wayte, as a manner of protest, sent a
letter to the Government expressing his intent not to register. Id. at 1527-28. After addi-
tional correspondence with the Government, the Government filed charges against
Wayte. Id.
132. Id. at 1528-29. The Court clarified the term "vocal opponent," stating it was
not limited to persons who publicly stated their opposition to the registration, but merely
to anyone expressly stating they would not register. Id. at 1529 n.6. Wayte submitted
evidence that an estimated six hundred and seventy-four thousand other offenders were
not prosecuted, while all thirteen offenders prosecuted at the time this case was before
the district court had been vocal offenders. Id. at 1529.
133. Id. at 1531-32.
134. Id. The Government did not prosecute those who spoke against registration
with Selective Service as long as they did not report themselves or were not reported by
others. Id. The Government did, however, prosecute those who reported themselves or
were reported by others but did not publicly protest. Id. For the Supreme Court, this was
sufficient evidence to show that the Government treated all the reported nonregistrants
in the same manner. Id.
135. Id. at 1532. Discriminatory intent implies that the Government is prosecuting
the particular defendant because of, and not merely in spite of, his or her belonging to a
particular class. Id. (emphasis added).
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clusion, therefore, the Court held David Wayte did not
demonstrate that his prosecution was motivated by his vocal
opposition to registration.13
The dissent in Wayte, lead by Justice Marshall, objected to the
majority's holding for two principal reasons. 3 7 First, the dissent
did not agree with the majority as to the elements of selective
prosecution. 38 Second, the dissent opined that the defendant
had shown a colorable basis to be entitled to further discovery of
government materials proving the elements of selective prosecu-
tion. 3 9 The dissent cited the case of Castaneda v. Partida4 ° as
listing the standards for proving selective prosecution.14 1 The
elements as propounded by Castaneda are that: (1) the defend-
ant is a member of a recognizable, distinct class; (2) a dispropor-
tionate number of this class was selected for investigation and
possible prosecution; and (3) this selection procedure was subject
to abuse or otherwise not neutral. 42
The dissent opined that the Court should not have disposed of
the selective prosecution claim on the merits. 43 Rather, the
Court should have decided whether Wayte was entitled to discov-
ery of Government documents and whether the district court
abused its discretion in allowing such discovery. 44 Justice Mar-
shall, writing in dissent, stated that to obtain discovery, the
defendant did not need to show a prima facie case of selective
prosecution but rather merely that his claim was not frivolous. 45
Justice Marshall then stated that Wayte had made such a non-
frivolous showing, or had at least provided a "colorable basis"
sufficient to entitle him to further discovery of evidence proving
his claim.
146
136. Wayte, 105 S. Ct. at 1532.
137. Id. at 1534-43. The dissent in Wayte thought that Wayte's right to discovery
was the main issue before the Supreme Court, while the majority decided Wayte's selec-
tive prosecution claim on the merits. Id. at 1534, 1539. The dissenting opinion in Wayte
was accepted by many courts as the rule for obtaining discovery in selective prosecution
cases. Developments in the Law - Race and the Criminal Process, 101 HARv. L. REV. 1520,
1557 n.99 (1988). See United States v. Gordon, 817 F.2d 1538, 1540 (11th Cir. 1987),
vacated on other grounds, 836 F.2d 1312 (11th Cir. 1988). This, however, was apparently
not accepted by the Court in Armstrong. Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1488-89.
138. Wayte, 105 S. Ct. at 1540-42.
139. Id. at 1540-42.
140. 97 S. Ct. 1272, 1280 (1977).
141. Wayte, 105 S. Ct. at 1540.
142. Id. (citing Castaneda, 97 S. Ct. at 1280).
143. Id. at 1534.
144. Id. at 1539.
145. Id. at 1540.
146. Wayte, 105 S. Ct. at 1542. The dissent argued that under the Castaneda stan-
dards, Wayte had clearly shown to be a member of a distinct class of"vocal opponents" of
registration. Id. at 1540. Further, there was evidence that the Government knew and
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The development of selective prosecution illustrates that the
requirements for proving such a claim have steadily increased.
More than two decades ago, a defendant could prove a selective
prosecution claim by evidence of disparate impact upon which an
inference of discriminatory intent could be drawn. 147 The effect
of such evidence was to shift the burden of proof to the Govern-
ment to rebut the inference of invidious discrimination. 148 After
Armstrong, however, courts will no longer accept proof of dis-
criminatory effect to infer discriminatory intent. 149 A defendant
bringing a selective prosecution claim must present credible evi-
dence showing different treatment of similarly situated persons
to be entitled to discover evidence establishing that claim. 50
In Armstrong, the Supreme Court appeared prepared to accept
statistical evidence tending to show discriminatory impact in
order to grant discovery, but the evidence had to be more credible
and sophisticated in nature than the evidence presented by the
defendants. 5 ' In addition, by limiting its holding to the stan-
dard for obtaining discovery as to the element of discriminatory
effect, the Armstrong Court left open the issue of what the stan-
dard for obtaining discovery is with respect to the element of dis-
criminatory purpose. 15 2 This limited holding may impose further
difficulties upon defendants seeking to obtain discovery to estab-
lish a claim of selective prosecution. Even if a defendant
presents sufficient evidence to obtain discovery for discrimina-
tory impact, it may be of no avail unless an independent thresh-
old showing of discriminatory intent is made. Even when
compelled to produce evidence of discriminatory impact, the Gov-
ernment might be able to object to disclosing evidence of discrim-
inatory intent on formal grounds.
consciously targeted the offenders who reported themselves, or were reported by others,
thereby making the claim at least "nonfrivolous" and warranting further discovery of
Government documents. Id. at 1540-41. As to whether the selection procedure was sub-
ject to abuse, the dissent stated that the decision to apply the "passive" enforcement
scheme was certainly subject to abuse. Id. at 1541-42. The correlation between those
who expressed their view on the registration and those who were prosecuted made it
susceptible to punishing free expression under the color of law enforcement. Id.
147. Crowthers, 456 F.2d at 1078; Steel, 461 F.2d at 1152; Falk, 479 F.2d at 621.
148. Crowthers, 456 F.2d at 1078; Steel, 461 F.2d at 1152; Falk, 479 F.2d at 621.
149. Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1488-89.
150. Id. at 1489.
151. Id. The Court noted that the "study" presented by the defendants in support of
their claim of selective prosecution did not identify persons of a different race who were
known to federal enforcement officers and who could have been charged with the same
offenses the respondents have been charged, but were not. Id.
152. Id. at 1488. The Court in Armstrong stated that "in this case [it] consider[ed]
what evidence constitutes 'some evidence tending to show the existence' of the discrimi-
natory effect element," indicating a limited holding. Id.
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Justice Stevens' dissent in Armstrong raises at least two sig-
nificant questions in response to the majority's opinion. 5 3 First,
did the district court judge abuse its power in ordering the Gov-
ernment to produce evidence sought by the defendants in sup-
port of their claim of selective prosecution? 5 4 Second, what was
the meaning of the sentencing statistics relied on by the major-
ity?. 55 As to the first question, Justice Stevens indicated that the
Court neglected to apply the proper standard of review against
the district court judge's decision to order discovery of Govern-
ment evidence, and failed to take into account the trial court's
inherent powers to do so.' 56 The Court, however, seemed intent
on setting the threshold showing necessary for obtaining discov-
ery in selective prosecution claims and resolving an apparent
conflict between the circuits rather than reviewing the trial
court's decision.
As to the second question, the dissent pointed out that the
proper comparison of similarly situated persons would be the
racial distribution of persons who committed crimes involving
crack cocaine and the racial distribution of persons actually pros-
ecuted for these offenses. 57 The percentage of convicted offend-
ers, however, seemed to support rather than refute the
defendants' claim of selective prosecution. 5 8 It would be more
helpful for the courts to have statistical information and reports
gathered and prepared by the Government regarding the profile
of persons that have committed, or are suspected of committing,
the particular crime in question. This type of information was
precisely, in part, the information that the district court in Arm-
strong ordered the Government to produce.
59
The Court also could have resolved the case by compelling dis-
covery of Government evidence in accord with how this was done
153. Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1492-95.
154. Id. at 1492.
155. Id. at 1494.
156. Id. at 1492, 1494-95. The dissent found that under the proper standard of
review, abuse of discretion, the district judge did not abuse its discretion in ordering dis-
covery. Id. The circuit courts have often afforded greater deference to a trial court's deci-
sion to order discovery by applying the abuse of discretion standard. See, e.g., Berrios,
501 F.2d at 1212.
157. Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1494-95. The majority recited reports of the Sentenc-
ing Commission stating how many persons were sentenced for particular federal crimes.
Id. at 1488-89.
158. Id. at 1494.
159. Id. at 1484. The district court ordered the Government: (1) to provide a list of
all cases from the last three years in which the Government charged both cocaine and
firearms offenses; (2) to identify the race of the defendants in those cases; (3) to identify
what levels of law enforcement were involved in investigating those cases; and (4) to
explain its criteria for deciding to prosecute those defendants for federal cocaine offenses.
Id.
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by the court in Berrios. Specifically, the Court could have deter-
mined what evidence would have illuminated whether the Gov-
ernment engaged in selective prosecution, and distinguished this
evidence from information serving merely to expose the Govern-
ment's prosecutorial strategy.16°
After Armstrong, determining when defendants asserting a
claim of selective prosecution have shown sufficient evidence to
warrant a discovery order is difficult. The Supreme Court has
indicated that although equal protection under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments deserves judicial protection, determin-
ing how much the judiciary may interfere with the executive
branch by inquiring into the Government's prosecutorial deci-
sions is equally important. In Armstrong, the principle of judi-
cial deference to broad prosecutorial discretion carried the day.16 1
The Court's decision seems to allow more prosecutorial discretion
without exposing the prosecutor to the high scrutiny that the
authority of such a function demands. Unfortunately, an exces-
sive measure of discretion might, if not checked, produce abuse
in the area of equal protection, and the Court may soon find itself
resolving the same issue once again.
Zoran Stojanovic
160. See Berrios, 501 F.2d at 1212.
161. See generally Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1486.
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